Firstly, this paper brings forth an encompassing definition of investment funds intended to track down some patterns of deviant governance. Secondly, it will focus on three conspicuous types among those funds: banks, mutual funds, and hedge funds. Such approach seeks to reveal deep similarities among them, albeit they may superficially look dissimilar. Afterwards, hinging upon the notion of opaque governance, we point out that investment funds more often than not misapply special purpose vehicles, in particular the so-called collateralized-debt obligations, just to hide their transactions, debasing their transparency, flouting good practices, even showing contempt of the law. Last of all, it will be put forward a protocol of covenants to be enforced by regulators on behalf of investors, taxpayers and financial markets. JEL codes: F34; G01; G18; G30
INTRODUCTION
Last financial crisis in 2007 raised strong concerns, even outrage, over the fact that governments had to bail out some banks and institutional investors from their own failures and wrongdoings, so as to allegedly avoid or put an end to macroeconomic turmoil. It goes without saying that such connivance with global Ponzi's schemes made governments face an angry backlash from voters and tax payers who blamed investment funds for bringing about such havoc, and claimed that the time was ripe for a comprehensive overhauling of financial markets and their practices 1 .
Be that as it may, and in spite of the faulty record of many investment funds, we cannot help acknowledging that hundreds of them usually abide by the law, delivering to their investors what they promise, and showing good governance practices. Therefore, we pay heed to the bad fellows only, whose misdeeds and opaque governance make a case for more regulation to the whole industry.
This paper sets forth three contributions to the current literature. Firstly, it shapes an embracing definition of investment funds that would be applied to the analysis of three well-known collective investment organizations, namely banks, mutual funds and hedge funds. Secondly, it casts to light how investment funds have purposefully been taking advantage of opaque governance structures through special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and collateralized-debt obligations (CDOs). Last, and in pursuit of improving the governance and performance of investment funds, we will advocate for a composite of covenants to be enforced by regulators on behalf of investors, taxpayers and financial markets.
Our line of argument will require the following stages of development. In section 1, we are going to expand on the semantics of investment funds. Sections 2, 3 and 4 will deal respectively with banks, mutual funds and hedge funds. It is for section 5 to benefit 1 There have been several worthy proposals so far, among which we can notice the ones rendered by Bank for International Settlements (2011); Cooper (2008) ; Minsky (1986) ; OECD (2008); Vickers (2011)] from the notion of opaque governance so as to cope with one of the most conspicuous vehicles for such opaqueness through the agency of collateralized-debt obligations. Last of all, in section 6 we set up a protocol comprising eight safeguards that regulators should enforce on behalf of investors and taxpayers, in order to shape up the transparency and accountability of investment funds worldwide.
THE SEMANTICS OF INVESTMENT FUNDS
To make operational the main argument conveyed in this paper, let us bring forward a much wider definition of investment fund than the currently used in the literature 2 .
Definition 1 Investment Funds
By an Investment Fund we mean any established and evolving organization whose persistent and professional business consists in a) purchasing and managing one or more portfolios of financial assets with the money provided by their creditors or equity holders, b) with the ultimate purpose of getting for their investors a beneficial risk-return profile.
Remarks a) Such organization could be either single-or multiple-purposed; whereas the former manages only one, the latter usually plays as a master fund, handling several portfolios.
b) A finer analysis would lead us to make a difference between the managers' organization and the underlying portfolio. However, we think that no loss of generality 2 Definitions, within the scope of this paper, stand for a semantic and methodological device suitable for any reader who may ask himself: which is the meaning this author attaches to such and such expression?
Under no circumstances our definitions intend to be regarded the best available, still less the only one that should be adopted.
ensues if we consistently regard the manager's organization and the portfolio as being functional tiers of a manifold structure we are calling "investment fund". c) As long as this sort of funds work with the money of their investors, hence they carry out a fiduciary role towards them, which entails that the targeted risk-return profile aimed by the fund's managers ought to stem from their considered judgment over ex-ante commitments and ex-post responsibilities 3 .
A methodological caveat is due here. Although there are many players in the investment fund business, among which we can underline, namely endowments (like foundations and universities), insurance companies, venture capital and private equity organizations, pension funds, fiduciary trusts 4 , this paper only deals with three types of investment funds that can be regarded as paradigms in their class, either for good or evil reasons: banks, mutual funds, and hedge funds.
BANKS
Whereas it is not customary to view banks as investment funds, their being so grows straightforward out of Definition 1. To ascertain their nature, it may prove useful to give a look at what amounts to be the stylized balance sheet of any bank (see next table) while keeping in mind the following remarks: a) Any kind of non-current deposit, like safe-or term-deposits, might be viewed as standing for par-bonds with only one coupon of interest due at maturity, issued by the bank on behalf of their depositors 5 .
b) To all intents and purposes, the bank's creditors end up purchasing those bonds through private placements. At the end of the day, hence, any bank carries out its job as an investment fund in the sense of Definition 1.
MUTUAL FUNDS
Mutual funds stand as a sect of themselves. The table on next page depicts their stylized balance sheet 7 . If we tried to assess the composition of any mutual fund's assets, we would find out three striking differences with bank assets: a) Although banks directly finance companies or governments by means of privately placed bonds, hence becoming first lenders, mutual funds are not necessarily involved in being first lenders to those companies whose stock or bonds they might purchase; in point of fact, such is not their customary line of business. They become buyers in the secondary market of available financial assets either through stockexchanges or over-the-counter markets. analysis of this topic can be followed in Stulz (2007) ]. But it should not be neglected the fact that there are thousands of mutual funds working offshore, Luxembourg being a leading case for instance.
HEDGE FUNDS
Last but not least, we arrive at one of the most elusive investment organizations in the financial markets, not only because they thrive on either missing or lenient regulations (a fact that has entailed, in several cases, regrettable leeway and shameless wheeling-dealing), but also of entrenched habits of secrecy involved in their transactions whereby regulators, investors, and the public mind have no means to know whether they are or not collective investment schemes for handling dirty money, coming from drug dealing, terrorism, tax evasion, political corruption or the smuggling of critical commodities.
Hedge funds predicate their competitive advantages upon two characteristics: a self-assertive claim on their unusual skills in portfolio management, and their commitment to an unyielding confidentiality. This could be praised as a marketing device, Other current or long-term liabilities, and equity provisions e) More often than not, to cope with the uncertainties of markets they leverage their long and short positions borrowing from banks with collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and repurchase agreements (Repos) 10 . As the last creditcrunch crisis has brought to light, this usually triggers off a widespread dominoeffect that heavily damages the hedge funds balances 11 to the extent that, and not surprisingly, some scholars have regarded the last crisis as a full-fledged run on
Repos. For instance, Gorton (2011a) argued that
The current financial crisis is a system-wide bank run. What makes this bank run special is that it did not occur in the traditional-banking system, but instead took place in the "securitized-banking" system. A traditional-banking run is driven by the withdrawal of deposits, while a securitized-banking run is driven by the withdrawal of repurchase ("repo") agreements. Hence, we describe the crisis as a "run on repo". […] We argue that the current crisis is similar in that contagion led to "withdrawals" in the form of For the last decades there has been not only an increasing concern about the role of hedge funds, but also a mounting pressure to enact a comprehensive regulation in order to constrain their outrageous leeway and lack of transparency. On this point, Stulz (2007) has cautiously highlighted a likely convergence of hedge funds to mutual funds that would be grounded on two developments:
i) The more regulated hedge funds grow eventually, the more similar to mutual funds they would become, mainly through regulations by the Securities Exchange Commission.
But this convergence will take away the traditional appeal of hedge funds, because their returns would decline and meet those offered by mutual funds.
ii) As long as hedge funds buy greater participations in the ownership of big companies, they become involved with their sustainability and even get access to their Boards. The unavoidable outcome of this process is what has been called the activism of hedge funds, which sooner or later backfires on their aggressive pursuit of higher returns and secrecy.
The downside of hedge funds
For the sake of illustration, we are going to highlight four negative features that seem to prevail in hedge-funds' performance.
The fallacy of superior returns (1)
As The Economist (2012a) asserted A simple-minded investment portfolio (60% of it in shares (SP500) and the rest in government bonds) had delivered returns of over 90% over the past decade, compared with a meager 17% after fees for the hedge-fund global index HFFX. (page 15)
The fallacy of superior returns (2) Conventional wisdom and vested interests have been holding that the competitive advantage of hedge funds lies in their performance at delivering higher returns than any other. On this point, increasing empirical evidence denies this assumption. For instance, Amin and Harry (2003) point out that traditional research is misleading whenever it is not wrong:
In general, the conclusion for this type of research is that hedge funds indeed generate superior results. There is a problem however. All these methods assume hedge funds returns to be normally distributed and to be linearly related to other asset classes. Recent research, however, has shown that neither of these assumptions is correct. (page 252)
Failure in valuation issues
Among the many technical and ethical problems that surround the business of hedge funds, there is one that makes a difference with mutual hedges: we are speaking, of course, about the valuation issue. Whereas mutual funds value their portfolios on a daily basis, and by the worldly convention of bookkeeping closing prices as valuation benchmarks, none of this applies for hedge funds, which proceed to design their portfolios values by means of secret procedures and theoretical models (Stulz, 2007 
THE OPAQUE GOVERNANCE OF INVESTMENT FUNDS
Let us assume that we are concerned, at certain date, with companies or investment funds belonging to a well known sample space: After these preliminaries, we move onto the key concept of this section 14 . Let us bring this definition down to the realm of investment funds 15 . For the sake of example, nothing better than the collateralized-debt obligations (CDOs) scheme, 13 Some companies around the world have started to issue a Statute of Governance. On this subject, see Apreda (2011a Apreda ( , 2011b .
14 Up to our knowledge, this was the first operational definition of the expression "opaque governance" in the current literature (Apreda 2012a (Apreda , 2012b .
because the three main types of investment funds we are dealing with in this paper have been strongly related so far to this structured finance vehicle. Firstly, and for the sake of foundations, we expand on the opaque governance of special purpose vehicles (SPVs)
since CDOs happen to be a particular class of such vehicles 16 .
SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES
These organizational forms are legal entities that require a sponsoring entity.
Among the sponsors (or sellers), we find commercial banks, finance companies, investment banks, mutual funds, hedge funds, endowments, insurance companies, nonfinancial corporations, or charitable foundations 17 , whereas on the side of SPVs, there will be limited liability companies, partnerships, endowments, corporations, and trusts (therefore, banks, mutual funds or hedge funds are able to carry out this role, directly or vicariously through partners). One distinguishing feature of these organizations consists in their being isolated from any financial distress of the sponsors; on this ground, it said that they grant "bankruptcy remoteness" to investors.
The plain vanilla mechanism by which SPVs become operative entails four characteristics (see Figure 1 ):
a) The sponsor sells assets to the SPV, receiving money for them.
b) The SPV sells securities to investors and shifts the money to the sponsor.
c) The sponsor contracts out a servicing provider to manage the SPV's administrative functions, even recruiting staff and directors. 15 Although offshore centers are main contributors of opaque governance around the world, the subject is beyond the scope of this paper, but the reader is referred to our paper on special purpose vehicles (Apreda, 2012b ) for a considered appraisal of this issue within a corporate governance context. Professor Palan has written two authoritative books on offshore locations and tax heavens (Palan, 2003 (Palan, , 2010 . A well-thought piece of investigative journalism has been supplied by Shaxson (2011). d) Sometimes, a Trustee may also be appointed to care for the creditors' property rights.
Source: Apreda (2012a) Among the most conspicuous examples of SPVs 18 , we can list the following:
 residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities;
 collateralized debt obligations;
 asset-backed commercial paper programs;
 credit-card receivables and automobile loans and leases;
 structured investment vehicles.
Among the staple variety of innovative products offered by SPVs, the so-called The essence of structured finance activities is the pooling of economic assets like loans, bonds, and mortgages, and the subsequent issuance of a prioritized capital structure of claims, known as tranches, against these collateral pools.
[…] This ability of structured finance to repackage risks and to create "safe" assets from otherwise risky collateral led to a dramatic expansion in the issuance of structured securities, most of which were viewed by investors to be virtually risk-free and certified as such by the rating agencies.
At the core of the recent financial market crisis has been the discovery that these securities are actually far riskier than originally advertised. (page 3)
There has been a mounting wave of criticism around the persistent scheming of SPVs throughout the last global financial crisis. For instance, the Basel Bank in its "Report on Special Purposes Entities" 19 , published in September 2009, pointed out the following:
It must be emphasized that the usage of SPE structures is not inherently problematic in and on itself.
[…] The current market crisis that began in mid-2007, however, essentially "stress tested" these vehicles. As a result, serious deficiencies in the understanding and risk management of these SPEs were identified. (page 1)
It's worth underlying the SPV's structure of governance because it allows them to misconstrue their original governance in favor of another one that grows opportunistic and stealthy, through utter opaqueness.
Ownership structure
Certain features about the ownership structure depend on the country where the vehicle is created. In the UK, a widely favored organization type is the limited purpose corporation, either domestic or offshore, which favors the use of a charitable trust as owner of the entity. In the USA, predominant ownership structures are the limitedliability corporations following Delaware regulations; alternatively, trust entities can be chosen instead. Most of the time as the SPV is located in an offshore center, such shadowy designs merely stand for bogus ownership.
Purposes of the SPV
In either case, when organizations are incorporated or legally enacted, their purposes are bound to the ownership structure and attested so in their founding charters.
On this account, SPVs are single purpose entities. Basically, they hold assets, upon which they issue securities, as it was highlighted in Figure 1 .
Control
The ownership structure and control rights depend on the legal jurisdiction chosen to incorporate the SPV. In the UK, for example, it is frequently favored the enactment of the so-called "orphan vehicles", whose capital is nominal and held on behalf a charitable trust [Northern Bank is a case in point and has thoroughly been reviewed by Shin (2009) ].
The advantage is that the originator does neither own nor control the SPV. Things are different for SPVs in the USA, because the sponsor owns the vehicle when it is a limited liability company, but the latter is legally different from the parental company. When the SPV performs like a securitized entity, its assets are often pledged to a trust.
Management
As for management and staff, SPVs have no employees, and the sponsors subcontract all ancillary activities to corporate-service providers, who deal with the logistics, management, and even board building with independent directors, pertaining to the SPV's needs. As Gorton and Metrick (2010a) sardonically put it, "SPVs are like robots". It is not surprising that SPVs utterly fail as far as accountability is concerned.
Assets sales
How do owners and the board of the SPV deal with control rights? The sponsor sells assets, usually writing them off from its balance sheet. With the money on tap from investors, the SPV brings the purchasing of assets into completion, which gives the SPV a comprehensive control right, keeping investors away from sensitive information.
Bankruptcy remoteness
This feature is naturally embedded in the incorporation statute or by-laws. The assets are isolated from the sponsor's creditors reach, an alluring fact that gives them leeway for good or evil.
Accountability and transparency
SPVs have become the darlings of the shadow banking system 20 just because they foster lack of diligence processes and transparency practices, showing an utter disregard for any sort of accountability design eventually. When the dusk settles down, embarrassing doubts and questions come out because of in-depth inquiries by journalists, academics, lawmakers, and the public mind, focusing on the role of law-and audit-firms in the shaping of these dealing and wheeling.
COLLATERALIZED-DEBT OBLIGATIONS
Collateralized-debt obligations, CDOs, carried out an important role in last crisis.
The simple vanilla SPV depicted on Figure 1 can be regarded as a stylized and particular environment for CDOs. The asset-side of any CDO consists of a variegated portfolio of different financial assets: residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities; investment grade corporate bonds; securitized bank loans; emerging markets bonds; trust preferred securities (trups); commercial paper and other CDOs.
Therefore, a CDO stems from the design of a portfolio manager, a trust fund that issues their own securities backed by the financial assets that belong to the underlying portfolio. In spite of some advantages, these vehicles are two-edged constructs, whose bad edge follows from the fact that they contribute to credit expansion beyond any prudential measure and control of regulators. Let us examine on Figure 2 .
For the sake of illustration, let us consider a financial institution that sponsors three SPVs designed after the CDO's structure. The bank, taking advantage of a portfolio based on credits (mortgage-backed or secured otherwise) sells it to his SPV-1, which issues CDOs backed by the securitized portfolio 21 . In point of fact, the money that SPV-1 gets from the CDOs sale is used to repay the bank for the securitized portfolio. After the transaction is brought into completion, the bank will substitute new money for old credits.
Source: Apreda (2012a) modified.
At this juncture, the bank has two basic options: either it lends money to companies and households, under the guise of plain-vanilla loans; or it buys mortgages, 21 Mostly notes and bonds. amounts to credit expansion outside the central bank mechanism of fractional reserves.
Next step replicates the pattern of the first stage, whereby SPV-2 buys a portfolio of credits in the bank's books, and issues CDOs, but with an innovation that allow mutual funds and hedge funds move to center stage: SPV-2 can buy not only the bank securitized portfolio, but other financial assets, among which CDOs from other SPVs (even from the SPV-1 itself). After the full round-robin transaction is concluded, the bank will be able to set into motion SPV-3. As we guess, this is a process that can go on through several replications.
When looking for the consequences of this kind of financial engineering, five features stand out, namely:
a) It goes without saying that as long as SPVs are nurtured by increasing values in mortgage or securitized assets, many investors will buy more securities issued by the vehicles, even resorting to new borrowing from banks. b) On their own side, banks are responsive to the increasing demand of CDOs and set up new SPVs, so that when investors borrow more money for purchasing SPVs notes and bonds, banks are ready to cater for their demand. At this stage, mutual funds and hedge funds follow suit availing themselves of structured-finance vehicles.
c) Many SPVs that issue short-term commercial paper or notes to pay off standing CDOs take advantage of the increasing demand from their securities and, it goes without saying, go on issuing more CDOs and rolling them over at maturity dates.
d) But if the upside trend that stands to back the financial engineering happens to revert to a downward path, then the chain of SPVs is doomed to fail and, worst of all, it sets into motion the well-known 22 and time-dishonored Ponzi's Scheme. e) At this point, and to fuel the Ponzi's Scheme, Repurchase Agreements (Repo) enter stage. This device allows borrowing by selling spot financial assets, to repurchase them forward, and is a healthy procedure as long as the assets pledged to secure the loan do not worsen their value in the market beyond prudential thresholds. If this took place, SPVs would be unable to pay their securities since loan rates by Repos would wildly run upwards, whereas the value of collaterals go bust. The latest crisis, for some authors like Gorton and Metrick (2010a) for instance, was a "run on Repo" 23 .
A final comment is in order to bring home what I regard as the gist of the matter:
the less enforceable the law becomes and the more lenient regulators or governments turn out to be, then the more opaque the governance of organizations will grow eventually.
A NEW PROTOCOL OF COVENANTS FOR INVESTMENT FUNDS
There is widespread evidence that in most countries some governance variables 24 end up regulated one way or another, as can be checked out in the available literature [see, for instance, Lopez Iturriaga (2009); also Kostyuk, Braendle, and Apreda (2007) ].
22 A Ponzi's scheme is a procedure by which companies, investment funds, banks, and governments, engage themselves whenever they resort to new financing not only because they run short of cash to pay interest on their older borrowings, but mainly because they need to pay principals at maturity and do not have the money, borrowing again and again at increasing pace. For a non-standard approach to financial conduits that foster the seeds of financial instability, Minsky's contribution (1986) is a major achievement that has deservedly been reappraised by The Economist (2010, 2011) . A recent and shameless Ponzi's scheme was devised by Bernard Madoff who stole 65 billion dollars from investors (Arvedlun, 2009 Although the disgraceful failure of gatekeepers and sometimes their apparent connivance at corporate regrettable practices has been widely reported, we can't help thinking about the sensible issue of the sheer lack of incentives offered to officers working for regulators, which brings about a perverse mechanism forcefully described by Thomas Sowell (1996) :
Much criticism of "incompetent bureaucrats" implicitly assumes that those in the bureaucracy are pursuing the assigned goal but failing to achieve it due to lack of ability.
In fact, they may be responding very rationally and ably to the set of incentives facing them. For example, government regulatory agencies are often very ineffective in controlling the industry or sector which they have a legal mandate to regulate. But it is a common pattern in such agencies for those in decision-making positions to (1) earn far less money than comparable individuals earn in the regulated sector, and (2) after a few years' experience to move in to jobs in the regulated sector. In short, they are regulating their future employers. Under such a set of incentives, it is hardly surprising that decision makers in regulatory agencies approach those whom they are assigned to regulate with an attitude that is sympathetic, cooperative, and even protective. Apreda (2011a Apreda ( , 2011b .
P2 Can you show your Governance-Risks Protocol and your Compliance Risk managerial function? If not, you must explain why.
The protocol for governance risks was firstly introduced by Apreda (2012a Just as companies often undergo credit-risk ratings, there must be regulated agencies that issue such certifications, to make financial innovations not only less risky, but more accountable to regulators, portfolio managers and investors.
P5 How are you ring-fencing your own business from others you cannot carry out?
After the credit-crunch crisis in 2007, the Vickers proposal (2011) comprised a comprehensive treatment about the ring-fencing of commercial banks from investment banks transactions. This standpoint suggests a natural expansion just to ring-fence banks and mutual funds from being involved with hedge funds whose structured-finance engineering could jeopardize the compliance of their fiduciary duties towards counterparties.
P6 What sort of certified capital requirements and collaterals are you ready to display on behalf of investors?
For capital requirements, the precedent can be tracked down to the so-called Basle Bank Pillars 29 . There is no technical reason to prevent these regulations from being enacted to investment funds and a lot to be gained in terms of governance quality. As regards collaterals, they should be tangible. This seems a core feature to provide with a safety network on behalf of investors. Otherwise, the global judiciary arrangements would be granting impunity to offshore centers that mock up the law and connive at criminal activities. There is an interesting attempt that would become fully enforced in 2014. We mean the FACTA (Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act) whereby the United States will require foreign financial firms to identify account-holders and investors who might be American. In turn, USA will reciprocate signing bilateral agreements (more than 50 countries so far), offering information about their citizens holdings in the USA.
P7

CONCLUSIONS
By and large, investment funds are decisive players in any global financial architecture whereby banks, mutual and hedge funds become conspicuous carriers that cater for the widest range of investors. At the same time, they shape avenues through which companies, households, dealers, institutional investors and governments work out their financial problems and shortages.
Be that as it may, however, some patterns of behavior in the investment fund industry have been triggering off waves of criticism that hinge upon the outrageous leeway and secrecy that pervades their decision-making and their financial innovation.
What is even worse, their failures bring about social and economic havoc among countries, investors, households and taxpayers.
30 Apreda (2012b) addresses the thorny issue of how little we know about the corporate governance of audit and law firms that, apparently, take advantage of the "preacher´s waiver".
After defining investment funds on a wider basis than it is usually done, this paper brought to light key features of those funds that play a consequential role in the global financial system and showed how they shift to the building up of their own opaque governance with guile. Finally, this paper contributes with a protocol of covenants that investment funds ought to follow on behalf of investors and tax payers all around the world.
